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Summary 
We investigate how the formal national provisions for pricing in the NHS (which are a form of 
prospective payment, known as Payment by Results) are operationalised at local level. 
Transactions costs theory and existing evidence predict that actual practice often does not 
comply with contractual rules. Our national study of pricing between 2011 and 2015 confirms 
this and indicates that such payment systems may not be appropriate to address the current 
financial and organisational challenges facing the NHS.  
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Pricing in the English NHS quasi market: a national study of the allocation of financial risk 
through contracts 
 
 
Introduction 
As in all markets, the negotiation and implementation of contracts for healthcare allow buyers 
and sellers to exchange information and provide a framework for the allocation of financial 
risk, primarily through pricing. Pricing of healthcare in markets is problematic because of the 
complexity of health services and the concomitant asymmetry of information between 
providers of care and its purchasers (Arrow, 1963). Firstly, it is difficult for purchasers to 
ascertain the costs of providing care. Secondly, it is even more difficult for purchasers to 
measure all aspects of the quality of care. If providers are forced to compete in respect of prices 
in order to improve efficiency, decreases in prices may well have the effect of reducing 
unobserved aspects of quality (Zwanziger et al, 2000; Propper et al, 2008). Across the 
developed world, various countries have made attempts to address the problem of how to arrive 
at prices for healthcare which would encourage efficiency while protecting the quality of care 
(O’Reilly et al, 2012). This paper concerns attempts to change the pricing of healthcare in the 
English National Health Service (NHS) quasi market1 over the past decade, concentrating on 
how the formal national provisions for pricing are operationalised at local level. This focus is 
important because it is misleading simply to analyse the formal provisions alone, as actual 
practice often does not comply with contractual rules (Macneil, 1981). 
The intention of introducing a quasi market into the NHS in 1990 was, inter alia, to improve 
efficiency by the use of competition between providers of care (DH, 1989; NHS ME 1990). It 
was envisaged that commissioners and providers of care would initially use local prices set by 
calculating the short run average total cost of every set of procedures, adjusted to allow for a 
six percent return on net assets (NHS ME, 1993; Dawson, 1994; Propper and Bartlett, 1997). 
                                                          
1 The NHS quasi market consists of tax funded purchasing of care by state actors on behalf of patients; and 
competition between providers of care which may be state owned or independent (Bartlett and Le Grand, 
1993). It has had three major incarnations: 1) 1990 to about 2004, spanning the Conservative and early period 
New Labour regimes under which negotiated prices were expected (although fundholding was abolished in 
1997); 2) 2004 to 2013 spanning the later New Labour regime after pricing reform using PbR until the coming 
into force of the HSCA 2012 under the Coalition government; and 3)  2013 to date when pricing is designed by 
a new national economic regulator, Monitor. 
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Price competition between providers of care was destined to form part of the operation of the 
quasi market (Propper et al, 2008). 
In practice, for the first few years of the internal market, scant information was available about 
the costs of care, and most contracts did not contain prices in respect of individual episodes of 
care. Instead, most contracts took the form of either block contracts or cost and volume 
contracts (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993; Rafftery et al, 1996). Block contracts amount to a fixed 
budget allocating the financial risks of over performance to the provider. Cost and volume 
contracts involve the setting of the volume of cases in advance, and may lead to additional 
payments where the target volume of cases is exceeded, thus mitigating the risk to the provider. 
At the same time contracts for limited volumes of some elective care were on a cost per case 
basis, which allocated the financial risk to the purchaser, as they could not cap their 
expenditure. These were made by individual GP fundholders (another form of purchasing that 
existed alongside health authorities, which were responsible for commissioning the majority of 
care). 
Greater sophistication was introduced into pricing of acute services in 2004 by ‘Payment by 
Results’ (PbR) (Sussex and Street, 2004), and this can be regarded as an important development 
in the quasi market. This prospective payment system entails that health care is categorised into 
a series of predefined activities (called Healthcare Resource Groups, HRGs). The idea of PbR 
is to sharpen incentives, as each episode of care reimbursed (or lost to another provider) is 
charged at national tariff rates, which are average costs across the whole country. This is meant 
to improve provider efficiency by driving down the costs of those providers whose costs are 
above average costs. PbR allocates the risk of over performance to the purchaser, while the 
provider is at risk of losing income if patients are not treated in sufficient numbers. In principle, 
PbR should obviate the need to negotiate prices. However, economic and socio-legal theories 
of contracting generally, together with empirical evidence on contracting and pricing in 
healthcare, indicate that the allocation of financial risk is often handled differently from the 
stipulations of formal contractual provisions (Williamson, 1985; Petsoulas et al, 2011).  
This paper reports a unique study of the changes in the NHS national pricing rules and the 
actual allocation of financial risk on the ground during the four financial years 2011/12 to 
2014/15. This period is particularly interesting due to the regulatory changes. The regulatory 
framework for the NHS was altered by the coming into force of the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 (HSCA) in April 2013. Under the HSCA, PbR was retained, and renamed the National 
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Tariff, and the responsibility for setting the level of the National Tariff was given to two bodies: 
Monitor (the economic regulator of the NHS market); and NHS England (NHS E), the body 
responsible for commissioning health care (either through other bodies, such as new local 
clinical commissioning groups of GPs, CCGs,  replacing Primary Care Trusts, PCTs, or directly 
itself). The HSCA can be seen as introducing a second set of major changes to the quasi market. 
The national standard contract, which was introduced in 2007, was retained. The form of this 
contract, including rules concerning pricing, was subject to changes introduced by NHS E each 
year. Although the HSCA in many ways continued the direction of travel set by previous 
reforms under the New Labour government concerning the use of competition to drive up 
efficiency and quality of care (Allen et al, 2011), the HSCA significantly altered the regulation 
of competition in the NHS through the creation of an economic regulator (i.e. Monitor) and the 
clear extension of competition law (and thus the jurisdiction of the national competition 
authorities) to apply to the planning and provision of NHS services (Sanderson et al. under 
review)  
It has been argued that the introduction of the new regime under the HSCA would have the 
effect of juridifying decision making, and thus removing the internal flexibility previously 
enjoyed by the NHS (Davies, 2013). The rationale for this was that, in order to produce a fair 
playing field between all types of provider (including independent ones), it was necessary for 
pricing rules to be transparent and applied equally to all providers. Prior to the introduction of 
HSCA, prices had been subject to flexibility in practice (Monitor, 2013). This paper will show 
that there continues to be a marked difference between the rules promulgated at national level 
and the allocation of financial risk by local actors. These findings are to be expected, given the 
well-known difficulties in contracting for healthcare, and the continuing influence of 
hierarchical factors (in particular the cash limited budget) on the NHS quasi market.  
Pricing policy in the NHS quasi market 
Before discussing pricing policy in the NHS quasi market, it is necessary to describe some 
aspects of that market. The salient point is that the total national budget for the NHS is cash 
limited, and the budgets allocated to those bodies commissioning care on behalf of patients are 
capped on an annual basis.  Traditionally, commissioners kept within budget by making 
patients wait for non-urgent care (Bevan and Hood, 2006). Until the introduction of the NHS 
Foundation Trust status in 2004, all NHS Trusts were required to break even on their income 
and expenditure account, taking one year with another. NHS Foundation Trusts are permitted 
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to carry over certain levels of deficits and surpluses, agreed with the regulator (Health and 
Social Care Act, 2003). 
As explained above, prior to the introduction of PbR, prices were meant to be set at cost. In 
fact there was little relationship between cost and price (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994; Propper 
and Wilson, 1996; Propper and Bartlett, 1997). In practice, local pricing continued to be 
unsophisticated for years. It consisted mainly of agreeing that the same overall sum would be 
paid to the provider as in the previous year, adjusted to take account of any efficiency savings 
demanded at national level (and any large changes in volumes of activity).  
One aim of PbR was to incentivise providers to undertake larger volumes of care to increase 
throughput and thus shorten waiting times. The payment of average cost for every HRG 
provided was thought to encourage hospitals to do more, as they would be paid at above 
marginal cost for additional work (assuming their costs were being brought down to near 
national average costs). However, Dawson (1994) argued that the local market structures were 
of small numbers of providers and high fixed costs, in which setting national prices for each 
procedure was inappropriate. It would work for markets characterised by a large number of 
sellers who are price takers, but not where a few large providers exerted significant market 
power and were able to restrict the supply of quantity and quality with little fear of new entry 
by competitors. Although Dawson was discussing the pricing policy under the ‘Costing for 
Contracting’ rules (NHSME, 1993), the point is also relevant to PbR. 
Despite a large increase in its use over the past decade, PbR does not apply to all activity. Some 
activity in acute hospitals is not subject to a National Tariff price, and is still subject to local 
agreement. It has proved difficult to create HRGs, and thus National Tariff prices, for care 
which is less episodic than acute hospital stays. There are no National Tariff prices for 
community health services (CHS) or, as yet, mental health services (MH) (Monitor and NHS 
E, 2014). 
Research has been undertaken, both in respect of the English NHS and other health care 
systems (e.g. Street and AbdulHussain, 2004; Kobel et al, 2011) concerning the best way to set 
prices in prospective payment systems resembling the PbR system in the NHS, and also into 
the effects on provider behaviour when these systems are introduced (e.g. Farrar et al, 2011). 
However, there has been very little research about how these pricing rules are operationalised 
at local level (Petsoulas et al, 2011 being the most recent example) and none since the 
introduction of the HSCA. This paper aims to fill that gap. 
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Theoretical framework 
In order to understand how pricing and allocation of financial risk in NHS contracts is likely 
to be undertaken in practice, it is necessary to understand how contracts for healthcare operate. 
The relevant theoretical frameworks are new institutional economics (Williamson, 1985) and 
socio-legal (Macneil, 1981).  A key concept is whether contracts are capable of being complete. 
Completeness means that the contractual document covers all eventualities. Contracts for 
health care are unlikely to be complete because health care has a number of features which 
mean that the transaction costs (TCs) are likely to be high. TCs result from imperfect 
information, either about the other party involved in the exchange (asymmetric information) or 
about the future (uncertainty). Imperfect information means that it is costly to enter into 
contracts, since the parties will have to incur the costs of negotiating and writing contracts. It 
also makes it costly to monitor, enforce and renegotiate contracts.  Health care is characterised 
by high levels of uncertainty and asymmetric information (Arrow, 1963). Parties to long-term 
contracts often do not plan and specify their contractual relationships completely (Macaulay, 
1963) and socio-legal and economic theories suggest that this might be an efficient strategy to 
reduce TCs.  In these circumstances, relational contracts might evolve and permit efficient 
trade (Macneil, 1981). In relational contracts, adjustments are made to the initially agreed terms 
during the course of the contractual relationship to deal with unforeseen contingencies 
(Vincent-Jones, 2006). Risk can be managed by the parties as events arise (when co-operative 
strategies can be developed) (Sabel, 1991).  
This theoretical framework leads us to hypothesise that, despite the fact that the NHS national 
standard contract set out clear rules for the allocation of financial risk through pricing of 
healthcare, these contractual rules may not have been followed in all cases. These 
circumstances are likely to apply in relation to some of contracts for healthcare in the NHS 
than others. Although PbR appears to be more ‘complete’ in contractual terms, as prices are 
fixed nationally, volume of activity is not. Thus, in the context of fixed local commissioning 
budgets, it is possible that financial risk will need to be managed in the local health economy 
in ways not foreseen by the PbR regime. Where pricing is on the basis of block contracts, the 
contracts can be seen as ‘complete’ in relation to total expenditure, which may be the most 
important parameter in the NHS. 
 
Our study 
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During 2012 to 2014 we undertook a study of the pricing rules in the NHS national standard 
contract in the financial years 2011/12 to 2014/15. We examined both the changing contractual 
provisions and the behaviour of contracting parties at local level.  
Design and methods 
The project consisted of three aspects: 
1. Detailed analysis of each year’s standard NHS national contract from 2011/12 to 
2014/15. 
2. Two national telephone surveys of commissioners in 2012 and 2014 to find out 
what pricing mechanisms were being used in formal written contracts, and how they 
were implemented (or not). We were able to interview 23 PCT commissioners in 
2012, which amounted to 15% of PCTs and a further 25 CCG commissioners in 
2014, which amounted to 13% of CCGs. They were spread out across England in 
rural, suburban and inner city areas.   
3. A series of three in depth case studies of three local health economies, looking at 
the contractual relationships between commissioning organisations and their 
providers of acute, mental health and community healthcare. Interviews of 27 
contracting personnel in commissioners and providers (4 with CSU personnel, 6 
with Acute Trust personnel, 15 with CCG personnel and 2 with a combined Acute 
and Community Care Trust personnel); observation of 21 contracting meetings (13 
in Acute Care Trusts, 3 in combined Acute and Community Care Trust, 4 in 
combined Community and Mental Health Trust, and 1 PCT internal contract 
strategy meeting) and analysis of local documents were used. This allowed us to 
gather in depth and contextual information not available from the surveys.   
This triangulated approach enabled us to put together a broader and more reliable picture 
of our findings: the surveys helped us put the case studies within the overall national 
context, whereas the case studies enabled us to pursue our research questions in greater 
depth. 
Data analysis was conducted with the help of the qualitative research software NVivo. The 
authors agreed the main themes derived from the research questions, the literature on 
contracting, and additional themes suggested by the data.  
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Findings 
Provisions of the national standard contracts 
The relevant provisions of the national standard contracts remained relatively stable during the 
research period until 2014/5 when greater local financial flexibility was permitted.  
For acute services the contract provided for the use of both national tariff (formerly PbR) prices 
and the negotiation of local prices in respect of care which was not covered by it. Although the 
principle behind the use of PbR was that providers should be paid for every episode of care 
delivered, the 2011/2 national contract included limits on activity which would be reimbursed. 
Commissioners could refuse to pay for more activity than had been forecasted. Since 2012, 
contractual provision was deleted because the then economic regulator, the Cooperation and 
Competition Panel, ruled that commissioners could not place a cap on activity, as it restricted 
patient choice. Nevertheless, each year’s contract provided that emergency admissions 
exceeding a local baseline figure from 2008/09 would only be reimbursed at 30% of tariff.   
The 2014/15 contract, for the first time, contained provisions specifically designed to allow the 
parties greater flexibility in pricing. ‘Local variations’ were designed to allow adjustments to 
prices or currencies to facilitate significant service redesign or reconfiguration. ‘Local 
modifications’ were allowed in the case of unavoidable higher local costs. Moreover, for 
2014/15 the contract allowed the parties to vary the base line figure over which emergency 
activity would be reimbursed at 30%. 
The standard contract did not contain pricing rules for mental health and community services, 
and these were negotiated locally in the form of block contracts. 
 
Negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of contracts 
The information collected in the surveys and the case studies were similar, which allows us to 
report them together, and to draw conclusions that we can be confident are likely to apply 
across the English NHS. We did not observe any salient differences between commissioning 
areas (or case study sites) which could be attributed to their geographical locations. We did not 
collect sufficient data in the surveys to allow us to correlate personal relationships with 
differences in handling pricing.  
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In respect of contracts between CCGs and NHS acute trusts, the allocation of financial risk 
outside the framework of the various formal pricing mechanisms was striking. Most of the 
contractual relationships between NHS acute providers and commissioners were characterised 
by the use of general annual financial settlements outside the terms of the contract. Whatever 
detailed financial provisions had been agreed and implemented during the course of the year, 
a final overall agreement was made at year-end which did not adhere strictly to the contractual 
provisions. It was not always possible for commissioners to pay the full contractually 
designated amount for activity undertaken, as their budgets were insufficient.  This appeared 
to be increasing over time, with more commissioners reporting not being able to afford to pay 
the full amount for the level of activity provided by the time of the second survey in mid 2014.  
Year-end deals were seen as pragmatic and inevitable in the context of the NHS. 
Well, this is, you see, this is where PbR shows its - how can I say? – its limitations.  At 
the end of the day, health economies need to be in balance, ... it’s in nobody’s interests 
to bankrupt any of the parties associated with the relevant health economy, and that’s 
almost a diktat in terms of public policy, okay?  (Case Study B, Commissioning 
Consultant, CSU) 
But there was variation between the commissioners who responded. Several confirmed that 
they simply followed the contract and paid for all activity undertaken, even if it was more than 
they expected. These were areas where there was sufficient money available to commissioners 
for them to afford to do so. 
The new provisions in the 2014/15 contract allowing for variation in allocation of financial risk 
were used by some CCGs, although by no means the majority. This was because other 
commissioners continued to make informal arrangements to allocate risk at the end of the 
financial year, and did not see any point in formalising these by notifying national regulators. 
Three commissioners had used the new provisions allowing for flexibility in national tariff 
prices (‘local variations’). One had submitted variations in relation to six tariff areas to 
Monitor. The provider is a tertiary hospital and the new approach was needed due to the fact 
that NHS E had taken over commissioning of some of the services. Variations to national tariffs 
were needed to keep within the CCG budget. Another commissioner had agreed a lower local 
tariff with its provider if a patient was admitted for under two hours, which was sent to NHSE 
and Monitor for agreement.  
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A few parties ignored the national instructions on pricing and agreed a block contract for all 
acute services at the beginning of the financial year in 2012 and 2014. This was because they 
could foresee that the local health economy could not bear the cost of PbR, with unlimited 
financial exposure for the commissioners. Not all of these agreements were reported to 
Monitor. By 2014, some commissioners had reported this to NHS E as ‘local modifications’. 
One commissioner explained that they might be forming an integrated care organisation, and 
this, in addition to the financial risks to the acute provider posed by transferring money to the 
local Better Care Fund (i.e. out of the acute sector),  required different payment provisions 
As a local community with financial pressures that each organisation is under, we 
agreed that it is financially less risky to have a block contract. We submitted like an 
'excusing note' to NHSE explaining why we did that. [ ....] We [may] have in our area 
an Integrated Care Organisation. That was part of the reasoning for looking at a 
different way of contracting this year to assure our providers, […] was to ensure that 
our acute Trust had that guaranteed income, so we were able to do the long term 
financial modelling to allow an integrated organisation to proceed. 
There was a conflict between different policy objectives: financial solvency for each NHS 
provider trust on the one hand; and reconfiguring services so that more care is provided outside 
hospital on the other. One commissioner director of finance pointed out: 
We did look, this year, at trying to move the Acute Trust contract away from PbR to 
more caps and collars [i.e. block] contract base, but, again, the Trust Development 
Agency [i.e. national regulatory agency] were not supportive with that approach. 
Because the Acute Trust is financially challenged, they didn’t want them to do that. But 
the only way we’re going to be able to redesign services and reduce the secondary care 
footprint is to try and take some of the discussion away from finance and prices to an 
agreement where we have a set level of income for a set level of activity and we 
collectively work together to step it down because the PbR system and the contracting 
is slightly perverse in that why would the Acute Trust want to step down activity when 
it gets paid for what it delivers? (CS A, Director of Finance, CCG) 
 
Despite the increased flexibility in the 2014/15 contract, most of the commissioners were still 
using the 2008/09 baseline for setting the point at which the 30% marginal rate for emergency 
admissions applied. Several had moved to later figures. One commissioner had done so because 
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there had been major changes in the configuration of acute services since 2008/09. Other 
commissioners had moved to later base lines, such as 2011/12, in one case after having been 
forced to do so after arbitration.  
In some places, commissioners felt obliged to pay so called ‘non-recurring’ additional amounts 
to their NHS acute providers in order to help the hospitals balance their books at the end of the 
year. This was related to the need in some areas to facilitate the reconfiguration of local 
services, which might require transitional payments to support changes in service delivery in 
the short term. This could only occur in areas where commissioners had sufficient additional 
funds available. 
We investigated how prices for non-tariff activity were agreed. In 2012 in most areas, prices 
paid the previous year were reduced by the current NHS-wide efficiency target. By 2014, a 
wider range of techniques was in use. In a few areas, there were attempts to bench mark local 
prices with those in other areas. And very rarely there were attempts to undertake more accurate 
costing exercises in respect of some of these services. These were undertaken in areas where 
there was particular concern that current prices were inaccurate. In addition, by 2014/15, 
increasing numbers of commissioners were insisting on agreeing a fixed sum in respect of these 
non PbR services – effectively another block contract. This was related to the poor financial 
situation in those areas, where money had to be saved in order to try to stay within 
commissioning budgets. 
In contrast to the behaviour with NHS providers, all commissioners reported being able to pay 
independent providers of acute services in accordance with the PbR rules. This may have been 
due to the fact that there were insignificant volumes of such activity, so the financial viability 
of the local health economy was not threatened. 
Block contracts were used in respect of CHS and MH services, in accordance with national 
contracting rules. Volumes of activity were monitored throughout the year and any over or 
under performance informed the setting of the next year’s block amount. Although the block 
contract limited financial risk for commissioners, it also impeded moving the activity from one 
type of provider (e.g. acute Trust) to another (e.g. community health care setting), which was 
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a national policy priority. In order to make such moves easier, the participants suggested that  
national tariffs were needed in respect of CHS so that money would follow the patient2.  
There's something about as we move forward, we recognise that we've got to transform 
services.  So essentially, less direct acute provision and more alternative provision, 
either a primary care, community care or social care setting.  Now, in order for that to 
happen, it's simpler that the money follows the patient.  So from that perspective, I think, 
going forward, a tariff type contract works better, because the money's more easily 
moved. (CS C, Director of Finance, CCG)  
 
Context for contracting 
The context in which the contractual relationships we studied took place was very important. 
First, the case studies demonstrated that personal relationships between staff were a vital 
element in facilitating effective contractual relationships. The degree of flexibility required 
could only be achieved where these worked well.  
Secondly, the increasing financial stringency affecting the whole NHS during the course of the 
study had an effect on the way in which the contracts could be used at local level. As less 
money was available, it became increasingly difficult for commissioners to adhere to the 
national tariff rules.  
Thirdly, in the later years of the study national and local policies entailed major service 
reconfigurations at local level, mainly aimed at shifting resources from acute care to social care 
and CHS.  The contractual pricing rules impeded this.  
Discussion 
The limitations of the study should be noted. The response rates for the two national telephone 
surveys were not very high, mainly due to the national organisational changes in respect of 
commissioning being carried out. Secondly, it was not possible to interview the same people 
in the two consecutive surveys, as staff had moved on. But the use of the case studies allowed 
us to observe some trends. 
                                                          
2 PbR pricing does not take account of trusts’ costs structures, so that the amount of money lost to a provider 
when the money ‘follows the patient’ is greater than the savings made by the provider due to not treating that 
patient. 
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The extent to which the evidence about contracting for healthcare has been consistent over the 
past two and a half decades is striking. It remains the case (as found earlier by e.g. Bartlett and 
Harrison, 1993; Petsoulas et al, 2011) that allocation of financial risk is often dealt with outside 
the formal structures of the contractual document.  
The informal flexibilities used by local staff have been incorporated into the formal system by 
the introduction of flexibilities into the 2014/15 standard contract. This is a new development 
for NHS contracting, and appears to be due to the new role of Monitor in setting transparent 
pricing rules. The changes can be understood as evidence that fixed national tariff prices are 
not appropriate in the NHS quasi market, as Dawson (1994) predicted. And it appears that there 
has been some increase in the divergence from the formal pricing rules over the past three 
years. The evidence from the study indicates that this is probably due to two factors: firstly the 
fact there has been increasing financial stringency in the NHS as a whole, while levels of 
activity have not diminished; and secondly, there has been an increasing national policy focus 
on reconfiguring local services. This latter factor requires greater flexibility in the allocation of 
resources in local health economies. 
As time goes on, it has become increasingly difficult for many local commissioners fully to use 
the terms of the national pricing rules to regulate their relationships with local providers. 
Although this was recognised to some extent in the 2014/15 contract, Monitor and NHS E will 
be reconsidering pricing in the NHS. This is particularly important in the light of The Five Year 
Forward View (NHS E, 2014), which indicates that different configurations of providers should 
be explored. The current pricing rules are insufficiently flexible to facilitate these changes.  
Monitor (2014b) has stated that the NHS should be moving towards a blended payment system 
including ‘activity-based, outcomes-based and capitated payment approaches’ (p. 7). It is not 
clear how easy it will be to reconcile this wider range of pricing mechanisms with both the 
current system of contracting and the organisational changes which the Five Year Forward 
View envisages. The latter appear to be more aligned with notions of hierarchy and planning 
than with market structures that use contracts with nationally set tariffs as a way to allocate 
financial risk between autonomous parties.  
Thus, we can conclude that not only is pricing in the English NHS more complex in practice 
than the official rules would indicate, but also that the current nationally determined prices 
set by the National Tariff are not appropriate in all circumstances for which they were 
designed.  As the NHS struggles radically to reconfigure services, it is necessary to 
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reconsider the appropriateness of a wider range of pricing mechanisms to facilitate moving 
care out of hospitals. One promising approach is capitation (Monitor, 2014b). 
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